Friday, August 20, 2010

KANTIAN VIEW OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

KANTIAN CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE


Deontological theories can be described as duty-based; ‘deon’ comes from the Greek word for ‘duty’. They concentrate on the nature of the action itself as well as its motive in order to determine whether it is right or wrong. Unlike the situation with utilitarianism, consequences don’t count in deciding how to act morally; it’s the rules that tell you what motive to act from and what action you ought to do, i.e. what your moral duty is.
Two main deontological theories
1. The moral theory of Immanuel Kant
2. Diving command theory
Kant’s moral theory is by far the most philosophically influential theory of the two.
Categorical imperative
The categorical imperative is Kant’s fundamental principle of morality. It acts as the criterion or standard for judging which actions are right and which are wrong. It does the same job for him as the principle of utility does for the utilitarians, but does it very differently, for instead of testing an action by looking at its consequences, it looks at its rationality, its consistency.
The categorical imperative distinguished between right and wrong action by universalizing the action’s maxim and seeing if this can be done consistently, i.e. without self-contradiction (maxims are the everyday reasons or principles that lie behind our actions and motivates them, e.g. ‘when in danger, run’; ‘finders keeper’; ‘never give a sucker an even break’).
If the maxim can be universalized without self-contradiction, then the maxim and its action pass the categorical imperative test and it is therefore morally right. This means that it’s morally permissible for everyone at all times, no exceptions allowed. If it can’t be universalized then it’s wrong, and all are duty- bound never to do it, not even if the consequences look good.

A more concrete image may help us to understand the job the categorical imperative has to do. Let’s look at this from a maxim’s point of view. Imagine a nightclub called ‘The Cats and Imps’. This is a moral club and it’s the hottest spot in town. Lots of out maxims want to get in there and be seen as moral because, once in, they beat all other non-moral maxims (the ones stuck outside). What this means is that moral maxims, on account of their higher status, override or trump all non-moral maxims when they clash with them. However, there’s just one problem. You have to get past the bouncer on the door. He’s the categorical imperative, and he’ll put just one question to each of the throng of maxims pushing to get in, namely, ‘Are you universalizable?’ If they can prove they are, then they’re in and can become moral duties. But if they fail the test, then they get thrown out as immoral and must not be acted upon.
So, how do you go about universalizing a maxim? Well, all you have to do is ask yourself, ‘what if everybody did that?’ In other words, you have to imagine if it’s possible for people universally to do what you’re proposing to do. If it turns out to be impossible, then this tells you that the action is wrong, and if it is possible, then it’s right. Kant’s thought is that, if it’s right for you, then it must be right for anybody else, and if it’s wrong for you, it’s wrong for everyone.
The categorical imperative is a universalizability test; actions that pass the test become moral laws, and those that fail are morally taboo. No one is allowed to make an exception of themselves or give themselves preferential treatment. This is why it is called ‘categorical’, because there are no ‘ifs’ or ‘buts’, and no get-out clauses from your moral duty. You must do the right thing; it is imperative, that is, commanded by the moral law.
Kant uses two main formulations of the one categorical imperative:
1. The formula of universal law, which states,
‘Act only on those maxims which you can will to be universal laws.’
2. The formula of ends, which states,
‘Always treat other persons as ends in themselves and never only as means.’
Kant gives an example of the categorical imperative in action. He himself gives the following illustration:
Suppose I want to borrow some money and I know that I can’t pay it back, but I also know that the only way to get it is to promise falsely to pay it back. Ought I to do this? Is it right? Well, we have to use the categorical imperative to test the maxim that lies behind the proposed action. The maxim would be something like: ‘whenever I need money I’ll borrow it on the basis of a false promise to pay it back, even though I never will.’ To apply the categorical imperative test you have to universalize this maxim by asking yourself the following question: ‘Can I consistently will that everyone borrow money on false promises when they need it?’ Kant argues that this maxim fails the test because it can’t be universalized without self-contradiction, which makes it not only immoral, but also irrational, ever to do it. It is self-contradictory because false promises must presuppose a context of general or It is self-contradictory because false promises must presuppose a context of general or universal reliance on true promises in order to work at all, i.e. in order to succeed at deceiving. But imagining or willing a world where everyone borrowed money on false promises would pull the rug out from under your own feet for, in a world like this, no one would believe you when you promised to pay the money back, and therefore wouldn’t lend it to you in the first place. So it is irrational because, in making the false promise, you want to be believed (that’s the whole point), but in applying the universalizability test, you will a world where you won’t be believed, and it is self-contradictory to will incompatible things at the same time. In effect, you end up wanting your promise both to succeed and to fail and that can’t happen because, like a square circle, it’s logically impossible.
The categorical imperative imposes various kinds of moral duties on us. Kant distinguishes between:
1. Perfect and imperfect duties
2. Duties to self and duties to others.
When combined, these generate four kinds of duties:
a. Perfect duties to self
b. Perfect duties to others
c. Imperfect duties to self
d. Imperfect duties to others.
The difference between self and others being obvious, we’ll examine more closely they perfect / imperfect duty distinction.
The difference between perfect and imperfect duties is that perfect duties allow no leeway at all as to whether or not they should be done on a particular occasion. They are absolute and without exception at all times. Disobeying them leads to a contradiction in conception/nature, that is to say, a strict logical impossibility (akin to the impossibility of having a married bachelor). It is this that justifies their stringency. Imperfect duties, on the other hand, do give you some room for manoeuvre in choosing how and when to obey them. But if you disobey them once too often, this will result in a contradiction in will, i.e. not an absolute conceptual or theoretical contradiction, but the slightly softer practical contradiction in terms of denying yourself what you might need as a human being, rather than as abstract logical mind.
Kant gives four examples, one for each of the four types of duty, illustrating how the two kinds of contradiction (in conception/nature, and in will) generate perfect and imperfect duties.
1. Perfect duty to self
Kant’s example: Never commit suicide.
2. Perfect duty to others
Kant’s example: Always tell the truth.
3. Imperfect duty to self
Kant’s example: Always improve your talents.
4. Imperfect duty to others
Kant’s example: Always help others in need.

Morality and rationality
The source of the categorical imperative is in objective reason, which demands consistency, universality, and necessity. For example, in the same way that everyone must believe that 2+2 = 4, so everyone must (ought) always to keep their promises. For Kant, moral rules, i.e. those maxims and actions that pass the categorical imperative test, are unbreakable. They are as objectively rational, and as universally necessary, as geometry and arithmetic. Breaking a promise is as self-contradictory as saying that sometimes 2+2 = 5, or that triangles sometimes have four sides.

REFERENCES:

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. tran. Ross David. Oxford: Oxford University press, 1925.

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